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Administrative Law in the United States Past, Present and Future
Alfred C. Aman, Jr.*
This paper will take a contextual approach to American administrative law.
It will examine the historic context and the legal significance of certain
administrative law doctrines and approaches. In so doing, it will examine
three distinct eras of administrative law: (1) the New Deal-A.PA., which I
date from 1929 to 1959; (2) the environmental era which I date from 1960
to 1980; and (3) the global era of administrative law, whose beginnings I
somewhat arbitrarily mark as 1980. This takes us to the present and the
foreseeable future.' I do not mean to imply that these eras are so distinct
that there is little overlap between and among them. Nor do I wish to imply
that somehow one effectively and fully supplants another. Quite the contrary; they are cumulative. Most of the law developed in each forms the
legal framework and provides the legal rhetoric for the developments of the
next. Law evolves by making use of the past; like time, it moves "backwards
from a receding past into an unknown future."2 These three eras of administrative law thus represent three layers of law that interact with one another, often drawing on the legal approaches and legal rhetoric of the past, but
also transforming them in their application to new problems and situations.
I will link interpretive and substantive trends in administrative law with
trends in constitutional law. In particular, I will examine two facets of constitutional and administrative law. First, I will analyze the overall constitutional structure within which administrative agencies must fit and act; this
will be followed by a comparison of the procedural demands of the fourteenth amendment to our Constitution with those required by the relevant
procedural statutes of each era. Closely related to this analysis will be the
role that courts play in interpreting both the constitution and the relevant
statutes involved.
The New Deal-A.P.A. Era
In 1933, Professor, but soon to be Justice, Felix Frankfurter commented on
the special significance of the Great Depression in the U.S.:
In this the fourth winter of our discontent it is no longer timerarious or ignorant to
believe that this depression has a significance very different from prior economic
stresses in our national history. The more things change the more they remain the
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same is an epigram of comfortable cynicism. There are new periods in history and
we are in the midst of one of them.'
Frankfurter, along with most New Dealers, believed that these extraordinary times required extraordinary solutions, experimentation, and innovation. Much of this reform was to come in the form of national legislation.
Frankfurter thus advocated the need for judicial restraint in the face of such
legislative attempts to lift us out of the depths of the Great Depression. He
criticized the Supreme Court as being too activist a court, far too willing to
substitute its judgments for those of duly elected legislators. He had good
reason to be critical. The Supreme Court had been very tough indeed on
previous legislative experiments that arguably interfered with the Court's
conception of "liberty." The Court's substantive due process approach evident in Lochner v. N.Y 4 gave it, in Holmes' dissenting view, the right to
read Herbert Spencer into the Constitution.5 More importantly, the
Court's view of a state's rights would also make national legislation vulnerable to constitutional attack. Up to the Great Depression and beyond, its
decisions reflected a very narrow interpretation of the commerce, contracts,
and other clauses of the Constitution."a This view resulted in a number of
judicial decisions declaring a variety of federal statutes void on constitutional
grounds.6 Congress' early attempts at delegating legislative power to federal
administrative agencies also conflicted with the Court's demand that these
delegations be accompanied by clear legislative standards. Thus, in A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States and Panama Oil Refining Co. v.
Ryan,8 the Court voided federal legislation for failure to provide the kind of
legislative standards required by the non-delegation doctrine.
In anticipating these legal battles and in advocating judicial restraint,
Professor Frankfurter did not ask that courts ignore reality or, as he put it,
"life." But "in reading life," the Court "must have a seasoned understanding of affairs, the imagination to see the organic relations of society, and
above all, the humility not to set up its own judgment against the conscientious efforts of those whose primary duty is to govern." ' So convinced of
the primacy of legislative as opposed to judicial solutions, he argued that "it
is unlikely that a legislature, in its efforts to solve these societal problems,
will otherwise than through inadvertences violate the most obvious and cardinal dictates of justice; gross miscarriages of justice are probably less frequent in legislation than they are in the judicial determination of controversies."'

,

Eventually the Court began to adopt the restrained approach to judicial
review of the constitutionality of federal and state statutes advocated by
Frankfurter and other New Dealers. In West CoastHotel Co. v. Parrish,"the
Court sustained a state minimum wage law for women, taking an approach
that foretold a significant change in the Court's approach to a wide range of
economic regulatory legislation. This was the beginning of the end for the
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doctrine of substantive due process. This more deferential judicial approach
to legislation was deepened and extended by such new Roosevelt
appointees to the Court as Justices Black, Murphy, Douglas, and of course,
Frankfurter himself. The doctrine of substantive due process was eventually
buried, at least in economic cases 2 ; the commerce clause was read more and
more broadly"; the tenth amendment became a mere truism 4 ; and the contracts clause seemed to drop out of sight.'" The non-delegation doctrine
used to strike down federal legislation in Schechter and Panama Oil seemed
to have peaked in 1935, only to resurface in the odd dissent from then on. 6
Ironically, there was one opinion that came down during the heyday of
the Supreme Court's confrontation with the New Deal that, in fact, led to
the extension of federal power. At the time it was handed down, however, it
was not only viewed as another setback for the Roosevelt Administration,
but a most unexpected one. From the point of view of the long-run growth
of the administrative state, however, it turned out to be a blessing in disguise.
In Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 7 the Supreme Court would not
allow President Roosevelt to remove William E. Humphrey, a Federal
Trade Commissioner appointed by President Hoover. Humphrey was not
at all sympathetic to the economic policies of the new President. Roosevelt
saw in Humphrey a reactionary and obstructive Commissioner who had no
place in his government. Humphrey, however, was determined to serve out
his full statutory term. He refused to resign. Roosevelt then fired him, but
sought grounds other than personal; therefore, he based Humphrey's
removal on economic policy grounds that highlighted the philosophical disagreement between Humphrey's policy preferences and those of the new
Administration.
At the time, presidential discretion to remove an official like Humphrey
seemed well within executive powers. 8 Myersv. United States9 was the controlling precedent. As Chief Justice Taft explained in Myers:
[T]here may be duties of a quasi-judicial character imposed on executive officers and
members of executive tribunals whose decisions after hearing affect interests of individuals, the discharge of which the President can not in a particular case properly
influence or control. But even in such a case he may consider the decision after its
rendition as a reason for removing the officer, on the ground that the discretion regularly entrusted to that officer by statute has not been on the whole intelligently or
wisely exercised. Otherwise he does not discharge his own constitutional duty of
seeing that the laws be faithfully executed.20
It is not surprising that this passage was written by a former President.
Myers certainly regards the problems of "recalcitrant commissioners" from a
presidential viewpoint, emphasizing that it is the President's Article II duty to
faithfully execute the laws.2"" It was a shock to the Roosevelt Administration,
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though, when the Supreme Court in Humphrey's Executor rebuffed its
attempt to exert this same kind of control. Many years later, Justice Jackson
characterized the decision in this way:
What the Court had before declared to be a constitutional duty of the President had
become in Mr. Roosevelt a constitutional offense. Small wonder that the decision
became a political instrument. Those who saw executive dictatorship just round the
corner had their fears confirmed: the President could be restrained only by the
Court. Those who thought the ghost of dictatorship wore judicial robes had their
fears, too, confirmed: the Court was applying to President Roosevelt rules different
from those it had applied to his predecessors.2
In retrospect, one might now add that Humphrey's Executor justified the
fears of those who foresaw a dramatic expansion of the administrative state.
The decision set forth an approach to separation-of-powers analysis that
constitutionally accommodated the "headless fourth branch." For Justice
Sutherland and the majority, this case did not deal with purely executive
officers since Federal Trade Commissioners occupy "no part of the executive power vested by the Constitution in the President."22 The Court recognized that Federal Trade Commissioners could investigate and report
antitrust violations, but it conveniently concluded that to the extent that an
officer "exercises any executive function - as distinguished from executive
power in the constitutional sense - [the officer] does so in the discharge
and effectuation of ... quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial powers, or as [an
officer of] an agency of the legislative or judicial departments of the govern-

ment."2"
This approach to the separation-of-powers questions raised by administrative agencies was, in fact, typical of the pragmatism of the New Deal.
Writing in 1938, James Landis, one of the New Deal's foremost architects,
set forth his views on separation-of-powers questions by emphasizing what
he called "intelligent realism." He compared corporate organization with
the way he believed governments must be structured if they are to carry out
their functions effectively. Landis wrote:
If in private life we were to organize a unit for the operation of an industry, it would
scarcely follow Montesquieu's lines. As yet no organization in private industry either
has been conceived along those triadic contours, nor would its normal development,
if so conceived, have tended to conform to them. Yet the problems of operating a
private industry resemble to a great degree those entailed by its regulation ....
The significance of this comparison is not that it may point to a need for an
expanding concept of the province of governmental regulation, but rather that it
points to the form which governmental action tends to take. As the governance of
industry, bent upon the shaping of adequate policies and the development of means
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for their execution, vests powers to this end without regard to the creation of agencies theoretically independent of each other, so when government concerns itself
with the stability of an industry it is only intelligent realism for it to follow the industrial rather than the political analogue. It vests the necessary powers with the administrative authority it creates, not too greatly concerned with the extent to which such
action does violence to the traditional tripartite theory of governmental organization.2 4
Humphrey's Executor provided the constitutional flexibility necessary for this
approach to governance to work.
As New Deal agencies became institutionalized, as the needs of an integrated national economy became apparent, national solutions to nationally
perceived problems became the norm. The Administrative State gradually
grew in size, complexity, and legitimacy. Constitutionally, the Court's willingness to defer to economic legislation meant that various regulatory solutions were advanced in an attempt to deal with the kinds of market failure
spawned by the Depression. This, however, did not mean that the administrative agencies created to implement these solutions had complete discretion to act. The Administrative ProceduresAct (A.PA.), passed in 1946,
provided a genetic statutory procedural framework with which these agencies had to comply. The procedural requirements of this Act were a significant check on the exercise of agency discretion.

The AA.
The Administrative ProceduresAct is a genetic statute that applies to most
federal agencies. It assumes that fundamental procedural questions and
approaches are the same, no matter what the particular substantive mission
of an agency may be. Adjudication is adjudication. Rulemaking is rulemaking. Indeed, the A.P.A. divides the procedural world into two parts - rules
and orders. It provides elaborate adjudicatory procedures for agency proceedings that trigger ss. 554, 556, and 557 of the Act," and it provides
more legislative procedures for proceedings that qualify as informal
rulemaking.26 The A.PA. thus requires that we distinguish between what
Professor Davis has calleOi adjudicative and legislative facts27 by establishing
these two primary kinds of agency proceedings - adjudication and rulemaking, both formal and informal.
Section 706 of the A.PA. provides for judicial review of these various
types of agency proceedings. It sets forth the complete spectrum of judicial
involvement in agency decisions - from no judicial review for actions committed to agency discretion" to de novo judicial review of certain other
agency actions.29 Between these two judicial approaches to agency decisions
lie varying degrees of judicial deference to agency judgments. Questions
involving the exercise of agency discretion are usually subject to a kind of
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rational basis test inherent in the A.P.A.'s arbitrary and capricious standard
of review. Underlying this standard of review is the assumption that agencies are best able to determine what policies it would be wise to pursue.
Agencies exist to exercise this kind of expertise and are better equipped to
do so than generalist judges.30 When adjudicative facts are involved in formal agency proceedings, however, courts apply the A.P.A.'s more stringent
substantial evidence standard.3 This standard usually results in a good deal
of judicial deference to agency fact-finding as well, particularly when issues
of credibility are involved and the fact-finder has had occasion to observe
the witness. Deference to agency fact-finding is also due to the agency's
expertise, but it is especially due to reasons of judicial economy and efficiency. The A.PA.assumes that courts could not, and should not, practically
speaking, essentially retry agency cases at the judicial level.
Courts can assume much more decision-making responsibility when
reviewing questions of law. Since Marbury v. Madison,32 it has been
"emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is."33 In such cases, traditional wisdom is that courts have the requisite competence to interpret statutes and legislative histories and rule on any
constitutional or statutory issues that might arise. But focusing on "questions of law," as if only one kind of question of law existed is misleading. In
fact, many kinds of questions of law can arise. Some involve the jurisdictional power of an agency to act.34
Others involve the application of a statutory term to a set of facts.3" Such
cases are usually complicated by the fact that courts are often reviewing an
agency decision that merges the agency's legal interpretation of a statutory
term with its own fact-finding functions. Still other legal issues involve the
agency's interpretation of its own regulations.36 Some of those regulations
may be in the form of legislative rules and others may be interpretive rules,37
or result in judicial consideration of the constitutional effects of certain
agency action.3" All these contexts present questions of law, but courts can
and often do treat these various kinds of legal questions differently, deferring to the agency in some cases and engaging in essentially de novo review
in others. To complicate matters further, these various legal issues arise in a
variety of factual contexts. Some cases may involve agency decisions that
may have, quite literally, life and death effects on the litigants involved.39
Others arise in the context of technical statutory regimes that require expert
bureaucratic solutions if day-to-day agency life is to proceed apace.4"
If one were to generalize about the role courts played during the New
Deal-A.P.A. era, it could best be characterized by the word deference.
Courts, of course, deferred to the legislature when it came to constitutional
challenges to an agency's enabling act. They also generally deferred to agency fact-finding, policy-making, and often even to determinations of law, particularly when questions of agency jurisdiction were involved. When courts
did not defer to agency interpretations of their own powers, it was usually
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because they interpreted them even more broadly than the agency. Courts
almost invariably interpreted the agency's jurisdictional statutes in such a
way as to extend rather than restrict agency power.4' In this era, courts were
willing to give Congress and its agents - administrative agencies - the benefit of the doubt in most cases.
This is not to say that judicial deference to agency A.PA. decision-making meant that agency discretion was unchecked or unfettered. A.RA. procedures themselves helped control agency discretion to a considerable
extent. This is particularly true when one notes the fact that ss. 554, 556,
and 557 of the A.P.A. require procedures approaching the kinds of procedural protections associated with federal court civil litigation - cross examination, an impartial decision maker, and a decision based on the record.
More importantly, most New Deal agencies used adjudicatory procedures
extensively - even when policy questions were at stake. These adjudicatory
procedures did much to structure and confine agency discretion. As agencies implemented their public law mandates, the A.RA. in general and its
formal adjudicatory and rulemaking procedures in particular provided the
kind of procedural protections that helped ensure that the individual ights
of the regulated were adequately protected. As Justice Jackson noted in one
of the first opinions to reach the Supreme Court involving the A.PA.,"2 the
A.RA. embodied a number of compromises between those whose view of
government intervention was skeptical, at best, and those who believed
ardently in the need for government intervention:
The Act ... represents a long period of study and strife; it settles long continued and
hard fought counteractions, and exacts a formula upon which opposing social and
political forces have come to rest.43
In that case, Justice Jackson went on to hold that the adjudicatory procedures of the A.RA. were, in fact, triggered by the constitutional requirement of a hearing before a deportation order could be executed. This decision was ultimately reversed by Congress. It was, as we shall see, very much
out of step with the way Courts generally interpreted the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment in the New Deal-A.PA. era.
The Due Process Clause in the New Deal-A.P.A. Era
Wong Yang Sung was a Chinese national who had overstayed his shore
leave as a member of a shipping crew.4" He was arrested by Immigration
officials. After a hearing before an immigration inspector, the inspector recommended that he be deported, The Acting Commissioner approved and
the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Wong Yang Sung then filed a
writ of habeascorpus arguing that his constitutional fight to due process had
been violated. He argued, in effect, not only that the Constitution required
more of a hearing than he received in this case, but that his constitutional
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rights triggered the adjudicatory procedures of the A.PA.. In particular,
Wong Yang Sung argued that he did not have an impartial judge, as
required under the A.PA.. The government admitted non-compliance with
the A.PA. but argued that the ImmigrationAct of 1917 did not trigger the
formal adjudicatory procedures of the A.PA. and that the procedures it
provided fully complied with the demands of the Constitution. The A.P.A.
and the Constitutional demands of the due process clause, they argued,
were not to be equated. The constitutional demands for a fair hearing could
be satisfied by less procedure than that required under the A.PA..
Writing for the majority, Justice Jackson disagreed. He reasoned that the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment clearly required a hearing
in a case of this sort. He then ruled, in effect, that the constitutional
requirement of a hearing necessarily triggered the adjudicatory provisions of
the A.PA.. Section 554 of that Act triggers its formal adjudicatory procedures when a hearing on the record is "required by statute." But Justice
Jackson held that "the limitation to hearings 'required by statute' ...
exempts from that section's application only those hearings which administrative agencies may hold by regulation, role, custom, or special dispensation; not those held by compulsion."4 In his view, the constitutional
requirement of procedural due process of law derives from the same source
as Congress' power to legislate and, where applicable, "permeates every
valid enactment of that body."4 Given the adjudicatory nature of a deportation hearing and the constitutional requirement that some kind of hearing
be held, Justice Jackson read the A.PA.'s language "required by statute" in
§ 554(a) to include the Constitution as well.47
When comparing the procedures used by Immigration officials with
those mandated by the A.PA., the Court concluded that Wong Yang Sung
had not received a proper hearing. In particular, the A.PA.'s requirement
that the A.L.J. be separate from the prosecutorial and policy-making functions of the agency was violated in this case. The Court concluded that
"when the Constitution requires a hearing, it requires a fair one, before a
4
tribunal which meets at least currently prevailing standards of impartiality. 1
This expansive reading of s. 554 did not last long. Congress statutorily
overruled the Court's decision to apply the A.P.A. in an immigration context.49 The implication in Wong Yang Sung that there was a constitutional
basis for a formal A.P.A. adjudicatory hearing on the record in immigration
proceedings also was rejected by the Supreme Court in Marcello v. Bonds."
In Marcello an alien had been convicted of a felony. He was ordered deported pursuant to the terms of Immigration and NaturalizationAct of
1952.1' The terms of the Act provided for an evidentiary hearing "specially
adapted to meet the needs of the deportation process." It then provided
that this procedure be the "sole and exclusive procedure for determining the
deportability of an alien under this section. 5' 2 After a hearing administered
under these provisions, Marcello was ordered deported. He challenged the
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procedure as violative of the A.PA. on grounds similar to those invoked in
Wong Yang Sung. Justice Clark, speaking for the majority, rejected Marcello's arguments relying both on the legislative history of the Act and the due
process clause. Justice Clark found the history of the Act clearly indicated a
desire on the part of Congress to create an exemption to the A.P.A.. Moreover, he held that the relationship between the hearing officer and his
supervisors did not "strip the hearing of fairness and impartiality so as to
make the procedure violative of due process.""3 In so doing, Justice Clark
treated the procedural requirements of the due process clause as separate
and distinct from the statutory procedural requirements of the A.PA..
Once the due process clause was decoupled, as it were, from the A.RA.,
it provided little in the way of procedural protection in most situations. This
is due largely to the fact that due process analysis during the New DealA.PA. era was dominated by the right/privilege distinction. This distinction was based on a model that saw administrative law "as a mechanism for
preventing government officials from trespassing on private interests when
such invasions have not been authorized by the legislature. ' 4 The due process clause thus protected only those interests protected by statute or the
common law. Thus, as Judge Breyer and Professor Stewart have noted: "If a
private person fails to give me a gratuity, or refuses me employment, or
denies me a supply contract, the common law ordinarily affords me no
redress. Similarly, when a government official refuses me welfare benefits, or
terminates my at-will employment or declines to purchase my goods, that
official has not infringed on any of my common law protected 'liberty' or
'property' interests, and accordingly need not show legislative warrant for
his action.""5 Such governmental benefits were privileges, not rights. They
certainly did not constitute "property" or "liberty" as defined by the com6
mon law. Thus, in Bailey v. Richardson,"
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected a claim for a hearing by a government employee who lost her job
because she was suspected of being disloyal. The Court stated that the due
process clause provides:
1

"No person shall ...
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law, ...
" It has been held repeatedly and consistently that Government employ is
not 'property' and that in this particular it is not a contract. We are unable to perceive how it could be 'liberty'. Certainly it is not 'life'... . In terms the due process
clause does not apply to the holding of a Government office."
The Court went on to explain that this is as it should be:
Constitutionally, the criteria for retention or removal of subordinate employees is
the confidence of superior executive officials. Confidence is not controlled by process. What may be required by acts of the Congress is another matter, but there is
no requirement in the Constitution that the executive branch rely upon the services
of persons in whom it lacks confidence.
A.C. Aman, Jr.
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A federal government job was, in effect, a privilege, not a right. The due
process clause protected only interests that were protected by the common
law or by statute. Otherwise, what was involved was a privilege and the
plaintiff had no constitutional recourse.
This constitutional approach to the due process clause was, in many
ways, out of step with the new and extensive role that the federal government was beginning to play in the New Deal-A.RA. era. It was, however,
consistent with the deferential approach the Court was taking to substantive
constitutional challenges to regulatory legislation under the due process,
commerce, contracts, and taking clauses of the Constitution. As the modern welfare and service state assumed a far more significant role, however,
the right/privilege approach began to break down. The environmental era
of administrative law witnessed a due process explosion triggered by the
landmark case of Goldbergv. Kelly."9 Indeed, the constitutional due process
approach taken by the Court in that case is very much of a piece with the
overall judicial and congressional activism that characterized the environmental era we shall now examine.
The Environmental Era
The environmental era began in the 1960's and reached its peak in the
1970's.1° The growth in bureaucracy during this era was enormous, adding
significantly to the regulatory structure established during and after the
New Deal. As Professor Lowi has noted:
Between 1969 and 1979, Congress enacted and Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter
signed into law over 120 regulatory programs (by conservative count) .... In 1960,
there were 28 major federal regulatory agencies; in 1980 there were 56, and all but
one of those was created after 1969. (The exception was the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, established in 1966.) Between 1970 and 1980, the
budgets for the federal regulatory agencies increased by 300% measured in real dollars.'
Moreover, these new agencies were much more policy-oriented than the
New Deal agencies that preceded them. Rather than rely on case-by-case
adjudication which had long been the hallmark of such New Deal agencies
as the National Labor Relations Board or the Federal Power Commission
(now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission), agencies such as the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, and the Consumer Products Safety Commission relied
heavily on the rulemaking process. This, in part, accounts for another indicium of bureaucratic growth relied upon by Professor Lowi:
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[Although many kinds of announcements are printed in the FederalRegister, it is
nevertheless indicative of the growth of regulation that the number of pages in the
Federal Register increased from 14,479 in 1960 to just 20,000 in the whole decade

of the 1960's, and then jumped by 300% to 60,000 pages in 1975. By the end of
1980, the number of pages had increased to 86,000.62

Statutory Proceduresin the EnvironmentalEra
The procedural provisions of the many statutes passed during this era significantly glossed the A.PA. Agency policy-making was now done pursuant to
rulemaking provisions, rather than the adjudicatory provisions of the A.PA.
But the informal rulemaking of the A.PA. was supplanted by the hybrid
rulemaking provisions of these new statutes. These provisions disregarded
the bright line the A.RA.draws between informal rulemaking and formal
rulemaking and adjudication. They combined aspects of adjudication with
rulemaking. Most notable was the use these statutes made of the substantial
evidence standard in policy-making proceedings. Such procedural innovations often affected the role courts played in reviewing the substance of
agency results. The reasoned decision-making mandated by the § 553(c) of
the A.PA. took on new meaning in some cases. Given the substantial evidence standard in the agency's enabling act, courts often looked for more
than just a reason to support an agency policy decision. They began to look
for a good reason to uphold the agency. Judicial review of policy decisions
became, at times, more stringent and demanding than during the New
Deal-A.A. era. The so-called hard look doctrine of judicial review came
into its own. This doctrine allowed courts to reverse and remand agency
decisions if the court believed the agency did not take a hard look at the
substance of the decision it made. In theory, the court was not itself taking
a hard look, but simply requiring the agency to explain itself more clearly.
In reality, the court sometimes could not help but take a hard look at an
agency decision, disagree with it, and demand better
reasons from the agen6
cy that satisfied the courts' view of the problem. 1
Both the substance and the nature of many of these new environmental,
health and safety statutes encouraged a more comprehensive approach to
judicial review. In addition to the procedural detail of the statutes of the
environmental era, the statutes were often more substantively detailed as
well.' The broad delegations of legislative power so typical of New Deal
legislation often gave way to a statutory specificity that, in some cases, made
statutes read like agency regulations.65 The agency had more specific
instructions as to what it should do, often necessitating more detailed reasons for the choices it made. Moreover, agency action now tended to cut
across industry boundaries. Rather than the single mission agencies that so
typified the New Deal, environmental agencies like the E.P.A. and safety
and health agencies like the Occupational Health and Safety Commission
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tried to achieve very broad statutory goals that applied to a variety of industries and entities. Such statutes also dealt with potentially irrevocable harms.
Thus, statutes such as the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act initially
tended to set forth their solutions in absolutist terms." In short, in place of
the more common law-like approaches to economic problems (dealing, for
example, with "just and reasonable rates" of interstate utility companies)
came more specific, almost civil code-like statutory commands of various
environmental statutes.6 7 The procedural complexity of these statutes, the
perceived irrevocable harms with which they dealt, and the specific and
absolutist nature of some of their substantive provisions, all led courts to
make more demands in assessing both the procedural and substantive ratio68
nality of the cases that came before them.
As we have seen, the post-Lochner cases of the New Deal and beyond
resulted in a relatively deferential constitutional approach to constitutional
challenges to economic legislation. The civil rights movement and the more
demanding constitutional scrutiny courts were providing in these individual
rights contexts created an activist role for the judiciary, one frequently
applied in health and safety contexts as well. This is'not to say that the
A.PA. model was abandoned completely or that deference was still not
accorded to most agency policy judgments and choice of procedures.
Rather, judicial activism and a judicially demanded form of agency rationality was now not only possible but much more common than ever before.
This increase in judicial activism triggered by these new statutes also had a
constitutional counterpart in a new era of due process decisions beginning
with the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Goldberg v. Kellf 9 in 1970.
Due Processand the EnvironmentalEra
Goldbergv. Kelly involved an action brought by residents of New York City
who were receiving financial aid under the federally assisted program of Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (A.F.D.C.). Their complaint focused
on the state officials who were administering these programs. They alleged
that the state had terminated benefits for some individuals and were about
to terminate them for others in violation of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
There were certainly some pre-termination procedures set forth in state
law. State law at that time provided that a case worker who had doubts about
a recipient's continued eligibility would first have to discuss these doubts
with the recipient. If not satisfied, she could recommend termination of aid
to a unit supervisor. If the supervisor agreed, she then sent a letter stating the
reasons for terminating the aid and notifying the recipient that he could
request, witlfin seven days, that a higher official review the record. This
request could be supported with a written statement prepared personally or
with the aid of an attorney or another person. If, however, the reviewing
official affirmed the recipient's ineligibility, aid would stop immediately. A
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letter from this official would state the reasons for the decision. At this point,
post-termination, the recipient could request a "fair hearing" before an
independent state hearing officer at which he may appear personally, offer
oral evidence, confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, and
compile a record. If the agency fails to overturn the decision at this point,
the recipient could then seek judicial review.
In Goldberg, the plaintiffs, in effect, argued that they were entitled to the
procedural protections of a "fair hearing" prior to termination of their benefits, not after termination. Specifically, they requested a personal appearance before the reviewing official, an opportunity to present oral evidence,
and an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Logically prior to the question of how much process was due is the question of
whether the due process clause applies at all. Thus, the first major issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether the welfare benefits the New
York welfare officials terminated were, in fact, "property" protected by the
due process clause. Such benefits had long been characterized as a privilege
under the approach taken by the Court in Bailey. Prior to Goldberg, there
had been a few creative judicial opinions that sidestepped the fight/privilege distinction 7° as well as a rather famous law review article by Charles
Reich entitled "The New Property."'" In that article Professor Reich argued
in 1964 that:
One of the most important developments in the United States during the past
decade has been the emergence of government as a major source of wealth ....
The valuables dispensed by government take many forms, but they all share one
characteristic. They are steadily taking the place of traditional forms of wealth forms which are held as private property. ... The wealth of more and more Americans depends upon a relationship to government. Increasingly, Americans live on
government largess - allocated by government on its own terms, and held by recipients subject to conditions which express "the public interest.72
In 1970, given the important and activist role played by federal courts in
the civil rights movement as well as the War on Poverty launched by
Congress during the Johnson Administration of 1964 to 1968, few could
doubt the fact that this was a reasonably accurate perception of the world
on which a judicially active court would most likely act. In fact, the government conceded that welfare benefits constituted "property" for the purposes of the due process clause. The Court thus stated the new law in a very
modern and increasingly typical way - in a footnote. It said:
It may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more like 'property' than
a 'gratuity'. Much of the existing wealth in this country takes the form of rights that
do not fall within traditional common law concepts of property.73
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The right/privilege distinction fell with hardly a sound.
For the Court in Goldberg, the primary constitutional issue to be decided
was whether the due process clause requires that the recipient be afforded
an evidentiary hearing before the termination of benefits. In analyzing this
procedural issue, substance inevitably affected the Court's analysis. The
Court considered as part of its due process calculus, the nature of the
claimant and what, in effect, was at stake:
For qualified recipients, welfare provides the means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care ... . Thus the crucial factor in this context ... is that
termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive
an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits. Since he lacks
independent resources, his situation becomes immediately desperate. His need to
concentrate upon finding the means for daily subsistence, in turn, adversely
affects his ability to seek redress from the welfare bureaucracy.74
In assessing the constitutionality of the state's pre-termination processes,
the Court thus took into account what it termed the "brutal need" of welfare recipients. It also emphasized the fact that one could not assume that
welfare recipients would be literate enough or sufficiently skillful to lodge a
written complaint with their supervisor. The Court was thus critical of the
fact that "the city's procedures ... do not permit recipients to appear personally with or without counsel before the official who finally determines eligibility."75 Similarly, failure to cross-examine witnesses was also considered to
be "fatal to the constitutional adequacy of the procedures." 76 Indeed, by the
time the majority was done, it was clear that in a case such as this, the due
process clause required a full oral, evidentiary hearing, on the record, with
an opportunity for counsel to be present b'efore such welfare benefits could
be terminated. Underlying this procedural approach were important dignitary values:
From its founding the Nation's basic commitment has been to foster the dignity
and well-being of all persons within its borders. We have come to recognize that
forces not within the control of the poor contribute to their poverty. This perception, against the background of our traditions, has significantly influenced the development of the contemporary public assistance system. Welfare, by meeting the basic
demands of subsistence, can help bring within the reach of the poor the same
opportunities that are available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of the
community.... Public assistance, then, is not mere charity, but a means to "promote
the general welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and to our Posterity."77
This case became the rallying cry for a new breed of poverty lawyers.
Legal aid clinics and public interest law firms, armed with Goldberg v. Kelly,
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were now able to challenge the procedural practices of a number of state
bureaucracies in federal court. The battle was procedural, but the substantive and political overtones of some of these cases were clear. Nor did the
applications of Goldberg stop with welfare bureaucracies. The case was
applied in a wide variety of contexts - on behalf of government employees
who lost their jobs, prisoners involved in discipline cases or parole revocation or parole granting cases, students involved in school disciplinary proceedings, and teachers challenging tenure denials. It became a potent
weapon, particularly for those whose claims were often ignored in mainstream politics. For the first time, legal aid lawyers could constitutionally
question the administration of state bureaucracies; invoke the scrutiny of
federal courts; and provide, if nothing else, bargaining chips for the broadbased substantive and procedural negotiations that usually also were
involved. Goldberg v. Kelly was the foundation for law reform cases
designed, for example, to reform a state penitentiary system or provide
more bargaining power to individuals who usually had little. In the process,
there is no question that some procedural abuses were exposed and corrected. There also is little question that federal courts began to feel, at times,
quite uneasy about their ever-expanding role.
The due process explosion begun by Goldberg, particularly as applied in
cases involving the poor and the powerless, was very much of a piece with
the civil rights movement that preceded and overlapped it. While courts
were able, on constitutional grounds, to void statutes and state practices
that discriminated on the basis of race, wealth never achieved the status of a
suspect class. Challenges to statutes based primarily on their wealth distribution effects were held not to be appropriate for federal courts and more of a
legislative matter.78 The due process approach to dealing with recalcitrant
state bureaucracies, however, allowed a federal court to assess at least the
procedural fairness of these wealth redistributive programs. The glare of
publicity, the fact that, perhaps for the first time, some state agencies had to
deal with their recipients as legal equals, had a profound political impact.
But the procedural implications of these decisions were not without cost.
Procedures cost money to implement, and, as we shall see, particularly in
social programs involving hundreds of thousands of recipients, providing
more process necessitated trade-offs with actual substantive benefits and
thus raised important fiscal allocation questions. Moreover, procedural due
process claims were on occasion abused and courts were undoubtedly subject to their share of frivolous due process cases.79
Particularly since the due process logic of Goldbergv. Kelly applied to a
variety of other new property situations, it was important for the court to
clarify just what would constitute a property or liberty interest in contexts
other than welfare. Perhaps the most important methodological case to be
decided after Goldberg was Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth.8"
David Roth was hired for a one-year term as assistant professor at Wisconsin
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State University from September 1968 through June 1969. At the end of
the year, he was not rehired. The University gave no reason. Under Wisconsin law, a state university teacher acquires tenure only after four consecutive years of employment; a decision to re-hire a one-year appointee is
completely discretionary. Roth brought suit claiming, among other things,
that the University 's failure to give him reasons or an opportunity for a
hearing prior to termination violated the due process clause.
In holding that he had no due process right in this case, the Supreme
Court set forth the basic analytical approach it would take in determining
whether the due process clause applied:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an
abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it.
He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it ...
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather they are
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that
stem from an independent source such as state laws - rules or understandings that
secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits."
Given this approach, the Court easily concluded that the property interest
in this case consisted of a one-year contract that had already expired. Since
this contract made no provision for renewal, there was no longer any property interest left to trigger due process clause protections.
The Court also addressed the liberty strand of this case as well, noting
that "in a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the
meaning of 'liberty' must be broad indeed ... ...
2 The Court, however, failed
to see how failure to re-employ Roth in this case affected this interest:
The State, in declining to rehire the respondent, did not make any charge against
him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in the community. It
did not base the nonrenewal of his contract on a charge, for example, that he had
been guilty of dishonesty or immorality.83
Moreover, the Court noted, there was no suggestion that the respondent's
"good name, reputation, honor, or integrity" is at stake." Nor did the Court
conclude that there was "any stigma or other disability that foreclosed his
freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities... .",5 With
neither a liberty nor a property interest present, the Court could not reach
the question of how much process was due.
This case thus set the basic guidelines governing cases such as these, but
the requirement of legitimate claims of entitlement established by positive
state law hardly limited the flow of cases that could and did come to Federal
Court - cases involving tenure disputes, prison discipline, public employment, student discipline, as well as a whole range of welfare and social
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security kinds of challenges. Given a property right or a liberty interest, a litigant could almost always argue that the procedures provided in his case
were constitutionally inadequate. A federal court could and did then examine the procedures of a vast variety of state agencies and bureaucracies. This
is not to suggest that in many of these cases justice was not done; rather, the
role of the federal court began to appear to be quite extensive if not, at
times, intrusive as well.
Inevitably, courts attempted to cut back on the flow of procedural due
process cases. Some opinions tried to cut them off at the very beginning of
the case by construing narrowly the property interest involved or the liberty
interest that could be protected. Justice Rehnquist tried to do this by use of
86
what he called "the bitter with the sweet" approach. In Arnett v. Kennedy,
he argued that the procedural provisions in a federal statute governing the
employment of a federal civil servant, Wayne Kennedy, substantially modified the substantive rights that that statute provided. Kennedy was fired
because it was alleged that he falsely and recklessly accused his superior with
attempted bribery. The statute that governed his employment provided for
some procedures before he could be dismissed. Justice Rehnquist reasoned
that these statutory procedures affected his substantive right to the job:
"where the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the
limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in determining that
right, a litigant in the position of the appellee must take the bitter with the
sweet."87 This attempt to, in effect, re-introduce the right/privilege distinction into the law did not command a majority of the court and was explicitly rejected in a later case. "
Justice Rehnquist was more successful in his attempt to limit the range of
liberty interests to which the due process clause applied. In Paulv. Davis,89
he successfully held that damage to one's reputation was not necessarily
enough to trigger the due process clause. This may, in part, have been due
to the implicit argument in that case that state tort law processes could
effectively provide the process due to Davis, a person who had his photograph and name included in materials identifying "active shoplifters," circulated among local merchants even though he had never been convicted of
such a crime.
A due process implosion occurred, however, when courts began to show
much more deference to the processes provided by various state agencies.
At the same time, courts became rather creative in determining what precisely constituted the kind of process that would satisfy the due process
clause. Though the logic of Goldberg dictated that a property or liberty
interest usually existed, courts were willing to find that even state court
remedies in tort would give the plaintiff the kind of process necessary to satisfy the due process clause"8 ; or that the informal processes the state might
have provided were adequate for the administrative task at hand.' But I am
getting ahead of my story.
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Despite these various attempts to pull back from the implications of
Goldbergv. Kelly, it is important to note how this due process explosion fit
in with the civil rights issues of the day; how it resonated with closer judicial
scrutiny of agency decisions, particularly those involving life and death
issues in health and safety regulation or irreversible environmental damage.
Courts treated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment very
expansively. The right/privilege distinction was repudiated. An individual
rights perspective dominated the application of the due process clause - a
perspective already familiar to an activist court that had been courageously
establishing, clarifying, and extending the civil rights of all Americans.
The Global Era of Administrative Law
Just as Professor Frankfurter saw the Great Depression as the beginning of a
new era, then lower court Judge Scalia (soon to be Justice Scalia) saw a new
era taking shape in the deregulation movement 50 years later:
There are vast tides in human history: The Age of the Industrial Revolution, the
Age of Enlightenment. Ours will doubtless go down as the Age of Deregulation in
the history books of the future ......
While it is, perhaps, hyperbole to compare deregulation to either the Industrial Revolution or the Age of Enlightenment, the "Age of Deregulation"
to which Scalia refers, undoubtediy constitutes a definitive movement.
The Regulatory and ConstitutionalContext ofAdministrative Law
in the Global Era
Deregulation, regulatory cost consciousness, and regulatory forbearance
have typified the 1980's and most likely will typify the foreseeable future.
This shift in approach to problems once seen as clearly within government's
domain is part of a deeper trend that marks a third era of administrative law
- the global era. Quite apart from ideology, deregulation is fueled not only
by major changes in technology in some industries, but by the increasingly
global competition that this technology facilitates.93 Global competition
places the costs of domestic regulation in stark relief. This is particularly true
when some of the new global competitors involved manufacture their products in countries that impose few or no regulatory costs on domestic industries. This not only favors such industries; it attracts new ones, as well.
Though a variety of manufacturing costs may account for the decision of
some industries to shift the production phase of their operations abroad, a
significant cost component for many of them includes regulatory costs."
Environmental and worker safety costs, for example, have had a significant
effect on the copper, silver, and automobile industries in particular.9" Regulatory costs such as these are thus exacerbated by the global competitive
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dimension that now exists in many industries. Perhaps more importantly,
the mere perception of this kind of competition can have important political
repercussions.
Regulatory cost-consciousness highlighted by global competition has
created and intensified a new kind of regulatory politics - a politics of efficiency. This politics is also fueled in the United States by numerous other
factors, such as the budgetary deficits that threaten our collective economic
well-being, growing political sensitivity to governmental expenditures, as
well as the imposition of governmental costs of all kinds (including taxes).
Regulatory goals must be achieved in as cost-efficient a manner as possible.9 6 Cost-consciousness pervades the implementation of most regulatory
programs today, particularly those administered by the President and subject to Office of Management and Budget review.97
Closely related to cost cutting is deregulation. Abolishing existing regulation in certain areas, as well as avoiding the creation of new regulations in
areas as yet untouched, would seem to constitute the ultimate cost-cutting
device. Deregulation for cost-cutting purposes readily blends into anti-regulation for ideological reasons. The momentum generated by deregulatory
change easily blurs the differences between attempts to achieve regulatory
goals more efficiently and the wholesale substitution of market goals and
market values for a regulatory regime already in place. Yet these differences
often are essential.
The perception of global competition with foreign corporations that do
business in countries with few or no environmental, health and safety rules
at all creates increased pressure for domestic regulatory cost-cutting. In
such circumstances legislative mandates based on reasonably acceptable
notions of market failure arguably may be undermined by the market values
and goals of a deregulatory regime.98 When deregulatory policies, such as
those advocated under the Clean Air Act,9 9 are superimposed by the executive onto existing legislative and regulatory schemes devised under very different legal assumptions, the Article II powers of the President may begin
to take on a new meaning. In extreme cases, the."take care" clause of Article II risks being converted into an independent and unconstitutional
source of executive legislation.' Thus, particularly in the context of deregulation, judicial deference to executive policy-making should be carefully
analyzed.
Courts do not always review agency deregulatory actions deferentially. In
some cases, they have applied the hard look approach.'0 ' Though generalization is difficult, the deregulatory efforts of agencies involved in economic
regulation pursuant to the broad delegation clauses that typify New Deal
statutes have fared better than the deregulatory efforts of agencies engaged
in health, safety, and environmental regulation." 2 Courts are more willing
to defer when an agency can convincingly show that it is using the market
as a regulatory tool, not as an ideological means of frustrating the goals of
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the statutes involved. Health, safety, and environmental issues usually
involve the kinds of value conflicts that make it difficult, if not impossible,
for an agency to contend that adherence to market approaches fully accords
with the goals and values of the Act involved. Moreover, the nature of the
statutes involved, their use of the substantial evidence standard in policymaking proceedings, and the usually more detailed delegation clauses in the
statute itself, give courts more to work with when reviewing agency deregulation in these areas.
Deregulation or non-regulation can be achieved in a variety of ways in
addition to the recision of existing rules. Many of these other forms of
deregulation are essentially unreviewable. Agencies, for example, have enormous discretion when it comes to deciding which rules to enforce.' Moreover, they have a great deal of discretion in deciding whether to regulate
new areas or simply to leave these new areas to market forces. Courts have
usually deferred to this kind of agency deregulation or non-regulation. In
fact, executive deregulatory initiatives have generated a new basis for judicial deference - the political accountability of the President.
Deregulatory agency policies have coincided with a perceived need for a
more active presidential role in controlling and directing agency discretion.
Indeed, the explosion of regulatory law and agencies in the 1970's has
given rise to what some commentators have called the "Administrative
Presidency."'0 4 This has also coincided with the development of constitutional theories that seek to justify greater and greater executive control over
the administrative process. 05
The sheer growth and the complexity of the regulation that resulted in
the 1970's has created great need to coordinate and control the policies of
these disparate agencies. Given the tendency of agencies to view the world
only from their own vantage point, executive coordination can help further
a broader, perhaps more realistic, view of the public interest. Increased
executive supervisory power is somewhat more likely to occur due to the
fact that many of the regulatory structures Congress created in the 1970's
departed significantly from the independent commission model that typified the New Deal. The Environmental Protection Agency, for example, is
headed by a single cabinet level Administrator appointed by the President,
with the advice and consent of the Senate. Moreover, Congress delegated
much of the substantive regulation dealing with health and safety issues to
executive cabinet officials such as the Secretary of Labor.0 6 Such governmental bodies are naturally more accountable to the President and more
easily influenced by presidential views as to policy. In addition, the executive
branch itself has tried to institutionalize its influence and control through
greater use of executive orders0 7 and a strengthening of its own Office of
Management and Budget.' The Supreme Court in Chevron v. N.R.D.C.'°
has helped to transform New Deal deference to agency expertise to deference to the political accountability of executive-controlled agencies, noting
that:
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While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is,
and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to ...
[resolve] the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not
resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities."'
All of these forces add up to a regulatory process which favors least-cost
regulatory alternatives to problems, and often the use of market forces
instead of command-control regulations. It is also one that tolerates more
abrupt change, driven by the President and the executive branch rather
than by Congress or the courts. The global era more easily rationalizes
change in terms of political power and accountability rather than agency
expertise and reasoned, deliberative and incremental change.
Due Process
The cost-consciousness of the global era is very much reflected in the due
process jurisprudence of the 1980's. It begins, however, in 1976 with the
Supreme Court's landmark decision in Mathews v. Eldridge."' Like Goldberg v. Kelly, this case dealt with a challenge to the constitutionality of state
pre-termination procedures. These procedures, however, were provided in
the course of a social security disability program that provided benefits to
workers during periods in which they were completely disabled. The plaintiff, George Eldridge, was first awarded benefits in 1968. When they were
terminated in 1972, he challenged the state agency's pre-termination procedures as unconstitutional.
The pre-termination procedures then in effect were as follows. After a
worker had been granted disability benefits, the agency periodically communicated with him and requested information concerning his present condition. Information was also obtained from his doctors. If there was a conflict between the information provided by the beneficiaries and that
provided through medical sources, the agency could arrange for a medical
examination by an independent consulting physician. If the agency's assessment of the beneficiary's condition differed from that of the beneficiary, the
beneficiary was informed that his benefits might be terminated. He was also
provided a summary of the evidence and afforded an opportunity to review
his file, submit additional evidence, and respond in writing.The state agency then made a final deteimination and notified the recipient in writing of
the decision and of his right to seek de novo reconsideration before a Social
Security Administrative Law Judge if he so chose. Once the state agency's
report was accepted by S.S.A., however, his benefits were terminated. The
de novo hearing and judicial review that follow could lead to a retroactive
award, but no payments were made while those procedures were underway.
The Court began its analysis of this case by distinguishing it from Goldberg v. Kelly. Eligibility for disability benefits was not based on financial
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need and thus was "wholly unrelated to the worker's income or support
from many other sources.
The Court assumed that brutal need did not
generally exist in this kind of case. It thus ignored the fact that the termination of benefits in Eldridge's case resulted in his eviction from his home. It
also ignored the fact that the welfare bureaucracy can be very slow. Though
Eldridge presumably could and eventually did qualify for welfare relief, the
intervening time between termination and the grant of such relief left him
with no financial support. The Court, however, did not see this case
through the eyes of George Eldridge. It did not take an individual rights
approach to the due process clause. It saw the class of disability cases as one
in which the individual claimants varied considerably. If anything, the Court
viewed the case from the perspective of the agency, an agency responsible
for thousands of cases.
Unlike the Court in Goldberg, the Mathews majority was thus unwilling
to assume that members in this class could not effectively deal with the kind
of written pre-termination hearing procedures provided. Indeed, the Court
emphasized the numbers involved, noting that in 1974, 3,700,000 persons
received assistance under the program.' Most significantly, however, the
case set forth an approach to due process that clearly resonates with the
cost-consciousness of the global era. To determine how much process is
due, the Court identified three distinct factors:
1
2

3

the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail." 4

One commentator has translated this approach into the cost-benefit language of the global era, as follows:
The first function takes into account the social value at stake in a legitimate private
claim - it discounts that value by the probability that it will be preserved through
the available administrative procedures and it then subtracts from that discounted
value the social cost of introducing additional procedures."'
Such an approach to due process may make particular sense in mass-justice programs that involve, quite literally, hundreds of thousands of claims.
But Mathews v. Eldridge has not been so restricted. It has been applied in a
variety of situations. Its flexible, cost-benefit formula makes it easy for
courts to decide that there may indeed be a property right or a liberty interest, but the process due is subject to cost-benefit analysis. This utilitarian
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approach to due process avoids the individual rights perspective of Goldberg
v. Kelly and gives courts both considerable discretion and the opportunity
to defer to agency procedures. This has been an important trend in the case
law following Mathews v. Eldridge. Courts are increasingly willing to find
that the process provided was, indeed, due." 6
Conclusion: The Global Era and Beyond
We have dealt, thus far, with administrative law - past and present. Predicting the future is, of course, a most difficult task. But if we are correct in our
approach to the subject, we know that past approaches and past rhetoric
will be very much a part of the future of administrative law. At least two
aspects of the present are likely to feature prominently in the future: regulatory cost- consciousness and an important, perhaps even an enhanced,
supervisory administrative role for the executive branch.
The rise of the trading state and the intensification of global competition
has dominated the global perspective on the issues I have been discussing.
It has placed the cost of domestic regulation in stark relief and has, at times,
not only fueled a cost-conscious and economic efficiency approach to
deregulation but an anti-regulatory attitude as well. The cost-consciousness
of the global era is not likely to disappear, but it is likely to be tempered by
the more complex, less anti-regulatory global regulatory discourse now
developing.
This new global regulatory discourse is increasingly more complex than
one that focuses primarily on global competition. It involves the interrelationships of at least two other important global factors: the global environment and the disparities in wealth that exist between developed and developing countries. These three global components - trade, the environment,
and development - are directly linked to an important domestic concern
with global implications: national security. The end result of the complex
global regulatory discourse that these factors generate and the interrelated
trade, environmental, and developmental issues to which it applies is the
emergence of new bodies of international law such as the Montreal Protocol dealing with the protection of the earth's ozone layer. More importantly, for our purposes, these global regulatory trends encourage domestic regulatory approaches that are internationally responsive. Despite its flaws, the
Bush Administration's proposed clean air act represents a significant shift
from the deregulatory and, at times, anti-regulatory approaches of the past
to a more streamlined and economic approach to U.S. domestic regulation
of the environment.
Whether the global perspective of the future is primarily an economic
one, based largely on global competition, or whether it is more complex,
and made up of environmental and wealth distribution components as well,
the trend toward greater and greater executive control of the administrative
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process is likely to continue. Congress as an institution is made up of individuals whose primary goal is to represent a particular locality or region.
Particularly in an era dominated by political action committees, negative
advertising, and the high cost of media-dominated elections, short-term
local perspectives tend to dominate. There is little room for statespersons.
As an institution, the Presidency is most likely to fill this vacuum. The President has a constituency broad and diverse enough to make it, theoretically
at least, politically possible to pursue a more global vision of change and the
future needs of the republic.
The more complex the global regulatory discourse becomes, the more
likely this trend toward greater presidential control of the administrative
process will continue. Issues such as the environment were long thought of
as essentially local and domestic concerns. The more global our perspective
becomes, the more domestic issues become a part of foreign policy and
even an aspect of national defense. The elimination of bright line distinctions between the domestic and the foreign could also theoretically encourage the revival of a strong Congress willing to treat as domestic what the
executive branch argues is a foreign policy concern. The basis of such future
conflict between the branches might be differing congressional and executive views on alternative global solutions to problems. To the extent that
congressional approaches to such issues are regional or arguably protectionist in nature, however, power will most likely continue to flow to the executive branch. The use of executive orders, particularly in conjunction with
the executive's use of its constitutional treaty-making powers may become
an increasingly important source of both international and domestic law.
A more complex global regulatory discourse is likely to have important
interpretive consequences, as well. I have argued elsewhere that the reappearance of formalism in judicial approaches to separation of powers issues
as well as the non-delegation doctrine was of a piece with an almost minimalist approach to the expected role of the federal government." 7 An interpretive approach that emphasized the separation of legislative, executive,
and judicial powers made a number of agencies, particularly New Deal
agencies, constitutionally vulnerable. It also was of a piece with a more ideological approach to deregulation that saw the return to the market as
something akin to a return to nature. The end result was, implicitly at least,
the re-emergence of an approach to administrative law that resulted in judicial protection of individual economic rights from interference by the federal government.
This formalistic approach to separation of powers issues is in contrast to
the Supreme Court's most recent decision in Morrisonv. Olson,"8 upholding the Special ProsecutorAct. That Act provided for appointment of a special prosecutor beyond the executive's immediate control when allegations
of fraud and corruption in the executive branch were made. In that case the
Court refused to take a narrow, fundamentalist approach to the question of
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whether executive power was unduly limited by Congress. The Court, in
effect, rejected the approach to separation of powers issues inherent in such
cases as I.N.S. v. Chada and Bowsherv. Synar. It opted, instead, for a balancing approach that, in effect, deferred greatly to the political compromises
struck by Congress and the President. The Court recognized the fundamentally political nature of the issues involved and its consequent inability
to engage in any kind of truly principled decision-making. The Constitutional approach it chose gives Congress and the President a good deal of
discretion to determine how best to protect the integrity of the executive
branch. It is also one that is more accepting of a public law conception of
administrative law. The Court no longer treats, nor is it likely to treat, separation of powers principles as if they were a part of the Bill of Rights
designed to protect individuals from the government.
In non-constitutional cases, the deference to executive decision-making
shown by the Court in Chevron v. N.R.D.C. is likely to continue to dominate the judiciary's approach to agency policy decisions and agency interpretations of unclear statutory provisions. This is not to say that the hard
look doctrine or reasoned decision-making is dead. But rather that it will
take a strong case indeed before the Supreme Court is likely to scrutinize
agency decisions. This is not to say that lower courts might not continue to
ride herd on certain agencies, even in policy contexts, but the general trend
will continue to treat executive policy decisions as largely beyond the
Court's competence. Of course, new global regulatory statutes that explicitly incorporate market approaches as statutory, regulatory tools, might find
future courts scrutinizing agency actions to be sure that they are sufficiently
efficient. Most likely, however, deference to the executive will prevail.
Increasing use of market concepts and market approaches to regulation
will not replace a public law model of administrative law. Market approaches
are not a return to 19th century individualism. The market is and will continue to be seen as a regulatory tool. Even in the global era of administrative law, the New Deal will continue to play an important conceptual role.
Notes
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Professor of Law, Cornell University. This article is based on a talk given to the Canadian
Bar Association in November of 1989. A version of these remarks has been published in
Japan in the (1990) 6 Keio Law Journal 1.
For a more complete treatment of administrative law in these three eras, see Aman,
"Administrative Law In A Global Era: Progress, Deregulatory Change and the Rise of
the Administrative Presidency" (1988) 73 Cornell L. Rev. 1101. This paper draws heavily
upon the framework established in that article and many of the arguments made in it, but
it will also focus on the interrelationship of the Supreme Court's interpretations of the
due process clause with other administrative law doctrines during these eras.
N. Frye, The Modern Century (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1967) at 31.
F. Frankfurter, "Social Issues Before the Supreme Court" (1933) 22 Yale L. Rev. 476.
198 U.S. 45 (1905) [hereinafter Lochner].
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5 Ibid. at 75.
Sa See, for example, Article I, s. 8 of the U.S. Constitution which grants Congress the
power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and
with Indian Tribes." Commerce... among the several States" was construed very narrowly by the courts in the early 20th century, making it difficult for Congress to legislate.
Article I, s. 10 prohibits any state from passing a "Law impairing the obligation of Contracts." During the 19th century, courts construed this provision in such a manner as to
limit considerably the power of the state to regulate economic activity.
6 For example, the Court struck down virtually all of the New Deal legislation that came
before it in 1935. See, for example, LouisvilleJointStock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S.
555 (1935)(Frazier-Lemke Act); A.L.A. SchecterPoultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495 (1935)(section 3 of National Industrial Recovery Act); Railroad Retirement Board
v. Alton RailroadC., 295 U.S. 330 (1935)(Railroad Retirement Act); Panama Ref Co.
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (section 9 of the National IndustrialRecovery Act). But
see Perryv. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935) (sustaining validity of Joint Resolution of
June 5, 1933, which declared gold payment contracts illegal); Nortz v. United States, 294
U.S. 240 (1935) (same).
7 295 U.S. 495 (1935) [hereinafter Schechter].
8 293 U.S. 388 (1935) [hereinafter Panama Oil].
9 Supra, note 3 at 486.
10 Ibid.
11 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
12 See Nebbiav. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
13 See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
14 Ibid.
15 See, for example, Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaidsdell,290 U.S. 398 (1934).
16 It was not until Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Industrial Union Department, A.L.C.I.O. v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 671-88 (1980) that the doctrine
began to experience a revival. Yet, there still is not a majority in the Court that would
apply it as Justice Rehnquist has advocated.
17 295 U.S. 602 (1935) [hereinafter Humphrey's Executor].
18 See R.H. Jackson, The Struggle For JudicialSupremacy (New York: Vintage Books,
1941) at 107-08.
19 272 U.S. 52 (1926) [hereinafter Myers].
20 Ibid. at 135.
20a Article II, s. 3 of the U.S. Constitution states that the President "shall take care that the
Laws be faithfully executed...."
21 Jackson, supra, note 18 at 109.
22 Humphrey's Executor at 628.
23 Ibid.
24 J. M. Landis, The Administrative Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938) at
10-12.
25 5 U.S.C.A. 5§ 554, 556 and 557.
26 5 U.S.C.A. § 553.
27 K. C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise,vol. 1 (St.Paul, Minn.: West Co., 1958) at 413
28 5 U.S.C.A. § 701(a)(2)(1982). See, for example, Hecklerv. Chaney, 105 S.Ct. 1649
(1985) (enforcement discretion is presumptively "committed to agency discretion").
29 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(F)(1982). See, for example, Porterv. Califano, 592 F.2d 770 (9th
Cir. 1979) (free speech issues in administrative context receive de novo review).
30 See generally, Landis, supra, note 24.
31 See 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(E).
32 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See generally, Monoghan, "Marbury and the Administrative State" (1983) 83 Columbia L. Rev. 1.
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33 Ibid. at 177.
34 See, for example, PhillipsPetroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954)[hereinafter
PhillipsPetroleum].
35 See, for example, N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications,322 U.S. 111 (1944) (applying the
statutory term "employee").
36 See, for example, Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milbollin,444 U.S. 555 (1980) (involving, in
part, application by the Federal Reserve Board of its own Regulation Z) [hereinafter
Ford Motor].
37 Traditionally courts have been more deferential to agency interpretations embodied in
legislative rules as opposed to interpretative rules. Compare Chryslerv. Brown, 441 U.S.
281 at 295 (1979)(legislative or substantive rules) with Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134 (1944)(interpretative rules); but see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NationalResources
Defense Council (N.R.D.C.), 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (the Court's deferential approach fails
to distinguish explicitly between the kinds of rules involved)[ hereinafter Chevron].
38 See, for example, Porterv. Califano, supra, note 29.
39 See, for example, Industrial Union Department A.F.L. -C.I.O. v. American Petroleum
Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980)(involving removal of benzene regulations); American
Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981)(cotton dust regulations).
40 See, for example, Ford Motor, supra, note 36.
41 See, for example, Phillips Petroleum, supra, note 34 (the Court extended the Federal
Power Commission's jurisdiction to cover the price of natural gas sold at the wellhead).
42 Wong rang Sungv. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950)[hereinafter Wong Yang Sung].
43 Ibid. at 40.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid. at 50.
46 Ibid. at 49.
47 Ibid. at 50. "We would hardly attribute to Congress a purpose to be less scrupulous
about the fairness of a hearing necessitated by the Constitution than the one granted to it
as a matter of expediency."
48 Ibid.
49 Because aliens were involved, Congress did not consider itself bound by the Court's constitutional reasoning. Thus, six months after this opinion was issued, Congress specifically
provided, in the SupplementalAppropriationsAct of 1951, 64 Stat. 1048, that deportation proceedings under the ImmigrationAct of 1917 were not governed by the A.PA.
50 349 U.S. 302 (1955) [hereinafter Marcello].
51 Section 241(a) (11) of the 1952 Act provides that a felony conviction at any time is
grounds for an alien's deportation.
52 Marcello at 310.
53 Ibid. at 311.
54 S.G. Breyer & R.B. Stewart, Administrative Law and RegulatoryPolicy, 2d. ed. (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1985) at 699.
55 Ibid.
56 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951)
[hereinafter Bailey]. See also, Cafeteria Workersv. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Breyer
& Stewart at 701-05.
57 Bailey, ibid., at 57. Cf. Ridgcv. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40 (H.L.).
58 Bailey, ibid.
59 397 U.S. 254 (1970) [hereinafter Goldberg].
60 Between 1966 and 1978, Congress passed, among others, the following significant regulatory statutes: 1) the OccupationalSafety &HealthAct29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982)
[hereinafter O.S.H.A.]; 2) the Reform Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act 15 U.S.C.
§381 et. seq.; 3) the Consumer ProductSafety Act 15 U.S.C. § 2051 et. seq.; 4) the
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Child Protection and Toy Safety Act 15 U.S.C. § 1261 et. seq.; 5) the Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act 30 U.S.C. § 807 et. seq.; 6) the Surface Mining Controland Reclamation
Act 30 U.S.C. § 1201 et. seq.; 7) the Truth in Lending Act 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et. seq.; 8)
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 24 U.S.C. § 621 et. seq.; 9) the Equal
Opportunity Employment Act 45 U.S.C. 20000 et. seq.; 10) the Clean Water Act 33
U.S.C. § 1257 et. seq.; 11) the Toxic Substances ControlAct 15 U.S.C. § 2601 et.seq.;
and 12) the Clean Air Act42 U.S.C. § 7401 et. seq.
61 T.J. Lowi, "Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, Conservatism and Administrative
Power" (1987) 36 Am. Univ. L. Rev. 295.
62 Ibid.
63 See, for example, National Lime Association v. E.P.A., 627 F.2d 416, 453 (D.C. Cir.
1980); Columbia Gas Transmission v. F.E.R.C., 628 F.2d 578, 593 (D.C. Cir. 1979);
United States v. Nova Scotia Food ProductsCorporation,568 F.2d 240, 251-52 (2d Cir.
1977); H&H Tire Company v. Departmentof Transportation,471 F.2d 350, 355 (7th
Cir. 1972).
64 See, for example, O.S.H.A., supra, note 60. See generally, B.A. Ackerman & W.T. Hassler
"Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the Clean Air Act" (1980) 89 Yale L.J. 1466.
65 Ibid.
66 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et. seq. (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et. seq. (Clean Air
Act).
67 Ibid.
68 See, for example, authorities in note 60, supra. For a full discussion of these issues, see
Aman, supra note 1.
69 Goldberg, supra, note 59.
70 See, for example, Ault Unemployment Compensation Case, 398 Pa. 250 (1960)(unemployment benefits not barred because of refusing to respond to rumors about disloyalty).
71 C.A. Reich, "The New Property" (1964) 73 Yale L.J. 733.
72 Ibid. at 773.
73 Goldberg, supra, note 59 at 262, note 8. The Court went on in that footnote to quote
another passage from Reich in a related law review article, to wit:
[S]ociety today is built around entitlement. The automobile dealer has his franchise,
the doctor and lawyer their professional licenses, the worker his union membership,
contract, and pension rights, the executive his contract and stock options; all are
devices to aid security and independence. Many of the most important of these entitlements now flow from government: subsidies to farmers and businessmen; routes for
airlines and channels for television stations; long term contracts for defense, space, and
education; social security pensions for individuals. Such sources of security, whether
private or public, are no longer regarded as luxuries or gratuities; to the recipients they
are essentials, fully deserved, and in no sense a form of charity. It is only the poor
whose entitlements, although recognized by public policy, have not been effectively
enforced.
(From C.A. Reich, "Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues"
(1965) 74 Yale L.J. 1245 at 1255.)
74 Goldberg, supra, note 59 at 264.
75 Ibid. at 268.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid. at 264-65.
78 See San Antonio Independent School Districtv. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
79 See, for example, Parrattv. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981)(claim that negligent loss of a
hobby kit by prison officials constituted violation of due process); Daniels v. Williams,
106 S.Ct. 662 (1986).
80 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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Ibid. at 577.
Ibid. at 573.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
416 U.S. 134 (1974).
Ibid. at 153-154.
See Cleveland Boardof Education v. Loudermil, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
424 U.S. 693 (1976).
See, for example, Ingrahamv. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
See, for example, Gossv. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
Statement by Judge (now Justice) Antonin Scalia at 45th Judicial Conference of the D.C.
Circuit, 22 May 1984, JudicialReview of AdministrativeAction In an Era of Deregulation, 105 F.R.D. 321, 323 (1984).
93 See, for example, G. Faulhaber, Telecommunications In Turmoil: Technology and Public
Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1987) at 23-37.
94 See Chapman, EnvironmentalStandards and InternationalTrade in Automobiles and
Copper: The Case for a Social Tariff(meeting of the Allied Social Science Foundation,
Cornell Agricultural Economies Working Paper No 89-3, December 1988) [unpublished].
95 Ibid.
96 See generally, S.G. Breyer, Regulation and its Reform (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982).
97 See, for example, A.B. Morrison, "0MB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The
Wrong Way to Write A Regulation" (1986) 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1059; C.C. DeMuth &
D.H. Ginsburg, "White House Review of Agency Rulemaking" (1986) 99 Harv. L. Rev.
1075.
98 See, for example, Motor Vehicle ManufacturersAssociation v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, 463 U.S. 29 (1983)[hereinafter State Farm]. For an earlier rejection of
market approaches to regulatory problems, see FederalPower Commission v. Texaco, 377
U.S. 33 (1964) (the Court held that the statutory mandate of just and reasonable rates
required regulation and not a determination that the market price would suffice).
99 See, for example, Chevron, supra, note 37.
100 Ibid. See also Aman, supra, note 1 at 1223-35.
101 See, for example, State Farm, supra, note 98.
102 Compare State Farm, ibid. (a strong review of auto safety, deregulation) with Black Citizensfor FairMedia v. FederalCommunications Commission, 719 F.2d 407 (1983) (deferential reviews of F.C.C. regulations streamlining licensing procedures).
103 See, for example, Heckler v. Chaney,supra,note 28; C.R. Sunstein, "Reviewing Agency
Inaction after Hecklerv. Chaney" (1985) 52 U. Chicago L. Rev. 653.
104 See, for example, West & Cooper, "The Rise of Administrative Clearance" in G.L.
Edwards, S.A. Shull & N.C. Thomas, eds. The Presidency and Public Policy Making
(Pittsburgh: University Pittsburgh Press, 1985) at 192 and 207-08.
105 See, for example, Bowsherv. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654, 108 S.Ct. 2597 (1988) at 2625, Scalia dissenting [hereinafter Morrison].
106 See, for example, OSHA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 651 (1970).
107 See authorities in Breyer, supra, note 96.
108 Ibid.
109 Chevron, supra,note 37.
110 Ibid. at 865-66.
111 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
112 Ibid. at 340-41.
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113 Ibid. at 323, note 1.
114 Ibid. at 335.
115 J.L. Mashaw, "The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudicaton in Mathewsv. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value" (1976) 44 U.
Chicago L. Rev. 28 at 47-49.
116 See, for example, Ingrahamv. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (post deprivation remedies
in state court can substitute for pre-deprivation agency hearings); Walters v. National
Association of Radiation Survivors, 105 S.Ct. 3180 (1985) (upholding statutory benefits
scheme in which legal counsel is effectively precluded).
117 See A. C. Aman, "How Separation of Powers Protects Individual Liberties" (1989) 41
Rutgers L. Rev. 796 (1989); Aman, supra, note 1 at 1201-23.
118 Morrison, supra, note 105.
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